📊 Lit Review Synthesis Matrix Example

// 8 papers about CEO duality + firm value, thematic clustering
📗 THEME 1: AGENCY THEORY
Monitoring hypothesis: separation chair+CEO reduce agency cost
📘 THEME 2: STEWARDSHIP THEORY
Information advantage: duality enable unified leadership
📙 THEME 3: CONTINGENCY
Effect moderated by industry, ownership, firm size
Paper Theme Theory Method Sample Finding Gap
Jensen-Meckling (1976) 1 Agency Theoretical N/A Foundation: principal-agent conflict Indonesian application limited
Fama-Jensen (1983) 1 Agency Theoretical N/A Separation decision/control beneficial Emerging market untested
Boyd (1995) 1 Agency Empirical US large firms Negative relation duality-performance Pre-2000 sample, US only
Donaldson-Davis (1991) 2 Stewardship Theoretical N/A Duality enable strong leadership Contradict agency view
Brickley et al. (1997) 2 Stewardship Empirical US S&P 500 Positive duality-performance Specific to large firms
Krause et al. (2014) 3 Contingency Meta-analysis 1992-2010 Effect varies by context Few Indonesian studies
Chen et al. (2008) 3 Contingency Empirical China firms State ownership moderate Indonesia BUMN context different
Indonesian paper (gap!) 3 ? ? IDX 2010-2020 YOUR RESEARCH Filling gap
🎯 GAP IDENTIFIED:
Literatur dominasi US/developed market. Indonesia/emerging market under-studied. Ownership structure unique (BUMN, family-controlled) may moderate duality effect differently. Sample 2010-2020 captures post-IFRS, post-GFC period — useful contemporary context.

OUR CONTRIBUTION: Pertama yang test duality effect di Indonesian context dengan ownership moderator. Expected: negative main effect, attenuated di BUMN (state monitor sub for board), strengthened di family firms.